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Crash estimate for Bermuda Conference;  
ONE-OCI relations

26 June 1953

Memorandum to Sherman Kent

Subject: OCI Article on East German Situation

1. On Monday 22 June, O/NE was given an assignment of preparing a crash estimate on probable Soviet courses of action in connection with recent developments in East Germany. This estimate was to be prepared for the use of US participants in the Bermuda meetings of 8 July.

2. It was determined that the paper would be of maximum use, if, despite the urgent timing, it went through regular IAC coordination. To meet the schedule it has been arranged for a final staff draft to reach the Board at 8:30 Monday, 29 July ? June?

3. There was not sufficient time in the preparation of the Staff draft to receive contributions from the various agencies. However, in order to obtain the views of as many authoritative sources as possible the following steps have been taken:

a. A cable was sent to the [redacted] on Monday advising him of the estimate, and his views were obtained by a telecon on Tuesday and Friday of this week.

b. A meeting was held with the Board of National Estimates on Tuesday to make sure that there was agreement on the broad lines of the estimate. A DD/P representative briefed the Board and responsible staff members on the German situation on Tuesday.

c. A member of the O/NE staff contacted OCI [redacted] and FBID for relevant information.

d. Members of the O/NE staff spent more than an hour in consultation with [redacted] an O/NE consultant, who happened to be in Washington this week.

e. Informal conversations with working level State Department people will be held before the Board meeting to ascertain the preliminary and unofficial views of OIR.

f. Obviously all traffic and news reports have been examined in connection with this draft.

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4. These various steps have been outlined to indicate to you that before the Board receives the draft on Monday a considerable amount of work has been done to get the broadest possible advice and intelligence within the limitations of the brief time available for writing. As well you know, the draft must yet be subjected to the examination of the Board of National Estimates, representatives of the IAC agencies and the IAC itself. The final estimate, therefore, will be one subjected to as much thought and critical examination as its crash priority could permit. In an OCI publication dated 25 June there is an article dealing with the subject of the estimate O/NE now has underway. I do not yet know whether the estimate made in this article will be consistent with the national intelligence estimate to be published by CIA. At present it would appear that the staff draft and this article are reasonably reconcilable. However, an estimate contained in a staff draft has frequently been considerably revised by the Board, the IAC representatives, and/or the IAC itself. It is therefore likely that there will be available in two separate CIA publications, coming out within a week of each other, two different estimates on a situation deemed important enough to be examined on a crash priority basis for an important international conference.

5. I do not propose to analyze the validity of the OCI output or the care with which it was written and reviewed. The issue, it seems to me, is regardless of the quality of the article and the procedure to which it was subjected prior to final publication, two CIA estimates will be available for US policy makers who must deal with probable Soviet reactions in Germany. If these estimates are consistent with each other, it would only be by accident.

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